An Empirical Problem for Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis works something like this: philosophers who are interested in discerning the true essence of some concept C present candidate definitions to a tribunal of virtues. For one, it is virtuous for a definition of C to include all those things that intuitively instance C and exclude all of those things that intuitively don’t. Thus, the conceptual analyst may discriminate between candidate definitions by prodding their susceptibility to intuitive counterexamples, as Gettier does when he formulates his counterexamples to JTB analyses of knowledge. It is also virtuous for a definition of C to be simple. William Ramsey writes that, “[i]f an analysis yields a definition that is highly disjunctive, heavily qualified or involves a number of conditions, a common sentiment is that the philosopher hasn't gotten it right yet. … To borrow a technical phrase from Jerry Fodor, analyses of this complex sort are commonly regarded as ‘yucky'” (Ramsey 1992, p. 2). Equipped with to
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