Naturalism Next

Conceptual analysis works something like this: philosophers who are interested in discerning the true essence of some concept C present candidate definitions to a tribunal of virtues. For one, it is virtuous for a definition of C to include all those things that intuitively instance C and exclude all of those things that intuitively don’t. Thus, the conceptual analyst may discriminate between candidate definitions by prodding their susceptibility to intuitive counterexamples, as Gettier does when he formulates his counterexamples to JTB analyses of knowledge. It is also virtuous for a definition of C to be simple. William Ramsey writes that, “[i]f an analysis yields a definition that is highly disjunctive, heavily qualified or involves a number of conditions, a common sentiment is that the philosopher hasn't gotten it right yet. … To borrow a technical phrase from Jerry Fodor, analyses of this complex sort are commonly regarded as ‘yucky'” (Ramsey 1992, p. 2). Equipped with to...

  Introduction Note 1: This post is a collaboration between Sebastian Montesinos, Joseph Lawal, Lucas Collier, and Benjamin (Truth Teller). Sebastian & Lucas are co-authors of Naturalism Next and their info can be found on the about us page . Joseph is a graduate student in philosophy at Yale University studying the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Benjamin (who goes by the moniker Truth Teller) is a philosophy autodidact and friend of the blog, whose work can be found here .  Note 2: This post is long, and blogger is bad with hyperlinks. Therefore, we are providing a version of this piece you can access on google docs with a table of contents that will let you jump to specific sections, for those who would prefer this option. Note 3: We are currently planning on publishing a new and improved version of this post, where we introduce new critiques to the argument and modify the current critiques we have made in light of reflect...